KARABAGH AS FACTOR OF REGIONAL STABILITY

TWO ''YES''s and TWO '' NO''s
Regional Security of Transcaucasus: Illusions, Reality, Perspectives.

             There are two ways of ensuring national security, which can lead to the regional security.
           The first one is the creation of the national armed forces, the national army. In this respect, Armenia has evidently reached major achievements by forming a well-armed and trained army. Azerbaijan and Georgia also created their national armed forces. But one should be realistic and acknowledge that, on the one hand, the aforementioned armies are not capable of ensuring the regional stability. On the other hand, they are not comparable to the armies of the other two countries of the Transcaucasus region, i.e., Turkey and Iran, since they are only able to fulfil tasks of local character.
           National security can also be achieved through political methods. This second way may be feasible in case favourable political conditions and the appropriate atmosphere in the region are created as a result of improving the relationships between all the states of the Transcaucasus region. This should be the target for the establishment of friendly or at least normal relations between the Transcaucasus states.

DENSE WEB OF BLOCKADES

          Soon it became evident that the idea of establishing friendly relations between the countries of the Transcaucasus region was an illusion, and this intention failed. Instead, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were involved in the ethnic-political wars. Despite the fact that the peace settlement has been maintained for six years by the parties involved in the Azerbaijan-Karabagh, Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Osetia conflicts, a peace agreement has not been signed yet. It is one of the political realities in the Transcaucasus which negatively impacts the problem of the regional security.
           Armenia succeeded in building friendly relations only with Georgia and Iran. No progress has been achieved in terms of its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
           Azerbaijan is in brotherly relations with Turkey, and friendly, even warm relations with Georgia. As to the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, they are far from being "friendly". Moreover, they tend to be cold, and sometimes, even tense.
           Georgia is relatively "luckier". It has built very close political and economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which the latter consider to be of strategic significance. The Georgian-Armenian relations are regularly characterised by the leaders of these two states as friendly on the grounds of the traditionally friendly attitude of the Armenians and Georgians to each other. It would be appropriate to qualify the relations between Georgia and Iran as "normal".
           Thus, the contradictory character of the relations between the three Transcaucasus republics, as well as their relations with Turkey and Iran represent one of the components of the political reality in the said region which cannot be ignored when referring to the regional security. Otherwise, one would be attempting to build a house on sand.
           In this connection an analysis of western experts was published in the British magazine "Economist" (August 18, 2000). According to the authors of the analysis, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Transcaucasus region appeared in a situation when, like the Baltic states, it could develop at high rates thanks to the Georgian wine and tourism, the technologies of Armenia and the large Armenian Diaspora, the oil and agriculture of Azerbaijan and its friendship with Turkey. This did not take place, and in the analysis the experts are attempting to explain the reasons of the failure. They note that "the external borders of the three Trancaucasus republics stretch for 3000 km, of which only 9 km of the border lines are friendly. In particular, it is the Turkey-Nakhichevan border, since Turkey and Azerbaijan cooperate in the economic, political areas, and the scope of their relations in the military affairs gradually increases. The remaining borders tend to separate, rather than join these countries. Further, it is stated in the analysis that "Technically Armenia and Azerbaijan are in the state of war. Turkey continues the blockade of Armenia. Iran attitude to Azerbaijan is reserved, and, similarly, Georgia maintains cold relations with Armenia. Azerbaijan and Georgia claim their territories back from the winner of the war. Meanwhile, Armenia and Abkhazia are for sustaining the status-quo".
           One may agree or disagree with these assumptions. However, it is hard to deny that the political situation in the Caucasus is unique, unstable and even hazardous in terms of the perspectives of the regional security. It can be stated that instead of a region based on the principle of co-operation, a different stuation dominates in the region.
           In reality the region represents a dense net of blockades. Azerbaijan and Turkey were the pioneers of initiating the blockades. Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh have been isolated by these states since 1993. In return, Armenia blocks Nakhichevan. Abkhazia has obstructed the railway connecting Georgia with Russia, thus blocking not only Georgia, but also Armenia and Azerbaijan. It may sound curious but by imposing blockade on Armenia and Karabagh, Turkey and Azerbaijan have actually appeared in a blockade themselves. They deprived themselves of the opportunity to utilize the communications of Armenia and Karabagh. As a result, Turkey and Azerbaijan fell into increased dependence on the Georgian communications which does not seem to be appropriate in terms of national security.
           Therefore, the region of Transcaucasus is not only the crossing point of the communications, but also blockades. It should be noted that there is hardly any other similar point in the political map of the world.
           The problem of the national and regional security cannot be resolved in a situation when the complex system of blockades is maintained. Otherwise, all projects and plans regarding the national and regional security will be doomed to failure. The addressing of the issue of security in the region should start from removing the isolation. This would enhance the process of establishing co-operation and stability in the region, and, therefore, stopping the confrontation and discord.

TWO CONCEPTS OF SETTLING CONFLICTS

          Along with the net of blockades, there is another serious problem which hinders the national and regional security in the Transcaucasus, particularly, the ethnic-political conflicts of Karabagh, South Osetia and Abkhazia. To be more accurate, it is an issue of correlation between the settlement of the conflicts and establishment of the co-operation based on the factor of time. The question is: should the co-operation be established before or after the settlement of the conflicts? There are two concepts for resolving the said dilemma.
           According to the first concept, the economic or any other type of co-operation should be embarked only once the problems are resolved. This approach dominates in the region and Azerbaijan consistently follows it. The Azeri leaders deny any collaboration, including economic co-operation with Armenia unless the Karabagh conflict is addressed. In their opinion, the priority is to settle the Karabagh problem based on the reinstating of the old status-quo in line with the Azerbaijanian model which, in essence, envisages the establishment of the Azerbaijanian jurisdiction over Karabagh. The Azeri politicians think that all other underlying issues should be regarded in the context of this model.
           Overall, Georgia adheres to this approach. Nevertheless, there is some difference between the positions of Georgia and Azerbaijan. As opposed to Azerbaijan, Georgia does not refuse to meet with the leaders of Abkhazia and South Osetia and directly negotiate with the latter on problems that need to be regulated. In fact, numerous meetings and talks were held between the Georgian officials and the leaders of Abkhazia and South Osetia. In light of the above-stated, it can be noted that Georgia holds a more flexible position than Azerbaijan.
           The Azeri leaders not only deny the idea of co-operation with Armenia before the settlement of the Karabagh problem, but also refuse any direct contacts with the officials of Mountainous Karabagh. The tough attitude of the Azeri leaders is a serious obstacle on the way of establishing and developing the economic co-operation and ensuring the security.
           The core idea of the second concept adopted by other countries of the region, including Armenia, is that the paramount importance of settling the existing problems is accepted. Moreover, according to the concept, the addressing of the problems is the key issue for ensuring the regional security. However, given the political reality and the deadlock situation in settling the ethnic-political conflicts in the Transcaucasus, it is worth looking for other approaches and non-standards solutions, as well as laying down new paths that would eventually lead to the solution of the problems. The supporters of the second concept believe that the establishment and advancement of the co-operation between the conflicting sides would change the situation and create more favourable political conditions, reinforce the mutual confidence, change the mentality of the people and, hence, open new horizons for the peaceful and civilised settlement of the conflicts. In turn, benefits would be achieved in terms of addressing the problems of both national and regional security.
           Evidently, it is not so easy to adopt a new position, and a certain time-period will be required for that. To some extent, political mentality needs to be changed. Demonstration of political will by the leaders of the Transcaucasus states will be required, and, in this respect their determination may play the key role.
           We think that economic co-operation achieved as a result of the new, non-standard solutions will be sufficient for ensuring the security in the region through the economic activity between the countries of the region. A new path will be laid which will undoubtedly serve for the purposes of the noble objective, the elimination of the second obstacle on the way to ensuring the national and regional security.
           By referring to the new political solutions set up in the region, the new political composition of Transcaucasus is meant. Traditionally, it is accepted that Transcaucasus constitutes three independent states. This fact cannot be contested. However, nowadays the said fact does not exactly reflect the political situation in the region. In the mid-90s the political composition of Transcaucasus was changed. At present there are five states in the region: in addition to the internationally accepted three states, i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, there are two states which are not acknowledged by the international community but exist de facto, i.e., Mountainous Karabagh and the Abkhaz Republic, no matter whether someone approves of it or not. The political palette of this region is represented by these states which influence on the formation of the political environment, including the problem of security. It is impossible to address the issue of the national security in Transcaucasus without taking into account the existence, opinion and interests of Mountainous Karabagh and Abkhaz Republic. Any ignoring of this reality may result in irreparable consequences and turn a new leaf of struggle.

THREE SECURITY ZONES

          Transcaucasus is not a region placed in a vacuum. It exists within the aforementioned regional and international systems which significantly affect the political climate and the solution of problems of national and regional security.
           According to experts, Transcaucasus is surrounded by three zones, which, in our opinion, can be referred to as three "security zones". It is impossible to understand the mechanisms of achieving, reinforcing and maintaining the security without considering the existence and influence of such zones.
           The first security zone constitutes the three primary neighbours of Transcaucasus: Russia, Turkey and Iran. These countries have in place their own ambitious policies. They have broad opportunities to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transcaucasus republics and the region as a whole. The political situation and the problems of security in Transcaucasus are directly influenced by the positions of the above countries.
           Russia has announced several times that Tanscaucasus is of critical strategic significance for the latter, and that it would not agree with the establishment or strengthening of the influence of any other country in the said region. Russia has military bases in Armenia and Georgia. In 1997 it entered into an agreement on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with Armenia. Both the military bases and the said agreement obviously serve as the key impetuses for Russia in ensuring its presence and protecting its strategic interests in Transcaucasus.
           After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Russia's position Turkey is attempting to play first fiddle in Transcaucasus. Supported by the USA, it tries to establish its predominant influence in the region and cast Russia out. Concurrently, Turkey pursues its Pan-Turkish objectives. Transcaucasus may serve as a natural bridge for Turkey for penetrating into Central Asia and further to East Siberia and West China. Naturally, worries not only Russia, but also China, given the large number of Turkish-speaking populace in these two countries and the possible separatist movements that can be embarked by the aforementioned groups of people supported by Turkey.
           Iran also has its views regarding Transcaucasus. It strives for holding a dominant or at least sufficiently strong position in Transcaucasus, as well as Central Asia. It is seriously concerned about the possibility of Turkey's strengthening its position in the region. Thus, Iran is ready to take any actions towards preventing the establishment of the Turkish control in Transcaucasus and Central Asia.
           Obviously, Iran has certain problems with Russia. However, it runs a cautious policy towards Russia, being aware of the fact that the strengthening of Russia's position does not involve so much risks for Iran as in case of Turkey. Besides, the positions of Iran and Russia are mainly in accord with each other in terms of certain issues (e.g. the status of the Caspian Sea, Pan-Turkism, economic co-operation, etc.).
           Therefore, it can be stated that Transcaucasus represents an arena of confrontation and competition. The first zone plays a huge, perhaps, key role with respect of the security and stability in the region.
           The second security zone is directly located behind the first zone and includes the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, as well as the Near and Middle East countries, i.e., Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldavia and Ukraine. The second belt may not seem to be so significant as the first one. Nevertheless, one should make a mistake by ignoring the former and its role in the issue of security in Transcaucasus. The countries of the second belt have their certain political and economic interests - and some of them even pursue their strategic goals in the region.
           In this respect it is worth noting ГУУАМ where Georgia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia were involved, also, the established favourable relations between Armenia and Greece, as well as the co-operation of Armenia with Syria, Bulgaria, Romania, etc. in the military sphere. The position of the second-belt countries may create a certain political environment around Transcaucasus and influence the achievement of balance of forces in the region. In addition, when determining the significance of the second belt in terms of the security in this region the trends of development in the 21st century should be taken into account since the second-belt countries will undoubtedly gain increasing weight.
           The third security zone includes the USA and West European countries which mainly act through various organizations, such as the European Council, OSCE, NATO, Minsk Conference, Minsk Group of the Minsk Conference, etc.
           Like Russia, the USA has declared Transcaucasus and its problems to be of vital significance for its national interests. The objective of the USA policy, according to the American leaders, is to prevent the re-establishment of the Russian domination in Transcaucasus, neutralize the influence of Iran, and, in general, reinforce its own strategic, geographical-political and economic positions in the region. In the implementation of the said policy the USA mainly relies on the support of Turkey despite the fact that the USA is not delighted by the Turkey's pretensions. Suffice to this, the USA does a lot for the development of bilateral relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
           According to the US concept, the implementation of its policy may guarantee the security in Transcaucasus.
           West Europe is interested in Transcaucasus as a natural bridge, which connects Europe with Near East, Central Asia and the regions of South-East Asia and China. In that sense this region is important for the European countries whose approach to the problems of security in Transcaucasus is based on the said factor. Therefore, their position should be considered in light of the political, strategic and economic interests of Europe. In terms of these interests the settlement of all conflicts and problems and establishment of the stability and security in the region is essential. Probably, this is one of the reasons why West Europe is so keen for including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in European structures.
           It has been noted that Europe acts through various organizations of which two can be singled out.
           The first organization is the Minsk Group, which performs the mission of the intermediary in the settlement of Karabagh conflict. If the three co-chairmen of the Minsk Group who represent the USA, Russia and France are successful, this will be indicative of a serious step taken towards the establishment of security and stability in the region.
           The second organization is NATO. We do not intend to expand on the said organization since it is a separate broad issue. In the context of this article it is noteworthy that it is impossible to stop NATO's expansion in the East. NATO is extensively becoming a key factor in the political reality and mechanism of security in Transcaucasus. At present the main question is: what should be done for not letting the actions of NATO grow into a new source for confrontation in the region given the positions of Russia, Iran, China and several other states.
           In addition, NATO plays a most important role in the settlement of some of the problems, including the elimination of the blockade of Armenia by Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO, and the decision of NATO on the liquidation of the Turkish blockade would be a serious practical step and strengthen the security in the region. It is a good chance for NATO to demonstrate its competence and ability to resolve the said problem in the peaceful way on the political arena and not in the battle field.
           Fortunately, certain forces in Turkey tend to be interested in the elimination of the blockade of Armenia and are critical about the short-sighted policy of the Turkish government.. An article titled "Caucasus Front" by the Turkish journalist Aktyun which was published in newspaper "Eni Bingel" (September 20, 2000) represents such tendency. It is stated in the article that Turkey makes mistakes in its policy in Caucasus, "We have major interests in Caucasus. For the sake of these interests we should give Armenia our guarantee of security. As a result, we could achieve a situation when Armenia would feel secure towards us. Thus, the establishment of security in the region would be promoted'.
           In this article the role of NATO is regarded in the context of the third security zone and therefore, we would like to send a clear message to the leaders of such powerful organization that it is not serious and promising to continue the blockade and at the same time think of reinforcing the security.

RECIPE FOR ESTABLISHING PEACE

           The relatively small Transcaucasus has become a zone of widely spread confrontations and conflicts. Very often many countries, including the powerful states, pursue their own political, strategic and economic goals at the expense of the interests of the other countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. As a result, the Transcaucasus region has turned into a specific bond of contradictory interests, which may lead the region to a tragedy. That is why the problem of security is a key issue for all sides involved.
           Below some ideas on ensuring security in the Transcaucasus region are given in light of the current political situation and balance of forces.
           First: the system of security should base on the two "No"s:
a) "'No"' to reestablishment of the old control over Transcaucasus in any of its forms;
b) "No" to the replacement of the old domination over Transcaucasus with any of its new forms.
           Second: the system of security should base on the two "Yes"s or the principles of harmonization of interests in the following aspects:
a) "Yes" to harmonization of interests of all countries of the three security zones with the interests of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia;
b) "Yes" to harmonization of interests within the countries of the three zones.
           Third: elimination of all types of blockades in Transcaucasus and establishment of active and open communications in the region.
           Four: application of new methods and non-standard approaches targeted at the development of the economic co-operation in the region without procrastinating this key task till the settlement of the ethnic-political conflicts.
           Five: maintenance of cease-fire and adherence to the official declaration on not re-launching any military actions.
           Six: conclusion of a pact on stability in the region. It is known that the leaders of all three Transcaucasus states, as well as several other states, principally agree with the concept of the above document. There are some disagreements with respect of its format. However, this should not by any means hinder its implementation. Disagreements can be settled in the course of negotiations.
           Seven: convening of the international conference on security problems of Transcaucasus under the auspices of OSCE (or any other international organization) with the participation of the three Transcaucasus republics and the states of the three security zones. The purpose of the conference would be the determination of the fundamental solutions to the aforementioned problems which would be mandatory and universal for everyone.

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