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WEST BETWEEN YEREVAN AND BAKU
OSCE Prepares to Bring Troops to Zone of Karabagh Confrontation
(by Armen Khanbabian)
The slowed down
process of the settlement of the Karabagh conflict is entering into a phase
of activation again. Supposedly, at this phase the co-chairmen of the Minsk
Group (MG) of OSCE, represented by Russia, the USA and France have overcome
the existing disagreements and are determined "to exhort pressure”
on the conflicting sides by setting forth proposals which “could not be
declined” neither by Baku, Yerevan nor Stepanakert. The optimistic prognoses
of the observers is supported by the argument that recently the multilateral
and bilateral meetings and consultations at various levels have become more
often, and, allegedly, as the result of such meetings the positions of the
conflicting sides have been considerably brought into accord.
In fact, in
light of the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, they
prefer not to discuss the peace-making issues so enthusiastically in Armenia
and the Republic of Mountainous Karabagh. The resolution principles have
always been of paramount political significance in Armenia and the career
of anyone involved in politics depends on how he or she approaches these
principles. On the other hand, the aforementioned subject is extensively
discussed in the Azeri mass media.
Thus, it is stated in the Baku newspaper
“Mirror” that the emissaries have presented the updated draft version of
the peace agreement, and president Heydar Aliyev thinks that it is “worth
considering” the proposals. As a matter of fact, the preceding initiatives
which envisaged the establishment of “a commonwealth” by Azerbaijan and
MKR were overall approved by Yerevan and Stepanakert, but rejected by Baku.
It is known that the peace-makers will never make essential modifications
to the proposals and will stick to the traditional concepts. In particular,
Karabagh has to move from the so-called security zone around MKR, i.e.,
six regions other than the Lachin corridor which connects Karabagh with
Armenia. The Armenian side was never against such version. However, Armenia
linked the removal of its troops to the claim for the guarantee of security
for NKR.
According to the Azerbaijani newspapers,
the important details of this issue which is crucial for the settlement
of the problem are being elaborated, e.g., the possibility of bringing international
peace-keeping troops into the region of the conflict for guaranteeing the
immunity of the Lachin corridor. Roy Reeve, the ambassador of OSCE to Armenia
has announced about such intention recently. Such actions which in theory
have been the subject of consideration for a long time are gaining visible
features.
Baku emphasizes that Yerevan is skeptical
about such alternative since it is possible that Turkish divisions would
be included in the troops (Ankara is a member of the Minsk Group of OSCE).
For this reason the presence of the peace-makers might be of temporary character.
In turn, the emissaries propose the alternative of exchanging territories.
This is unacceptable for Armenia since it will lose its common border with
Iran. In this background the alternative of launching peace-keeping forces
seems to be more acceptable, and eventually, Armenia might not object to
it.
Naturally, the recommendations
of the emissaries are not limited to this. Under any scenario Karrabagh
will de jure remain as part of Azerbaijan, and no other alternative could
be otherwise expected. It was recently stated by president Kocharyan in
the context of the aforementioned problem that the factual independence
and security of Karabagh was the issue of utmost importance. Indirectly,
this is indicative of the certain interim success of the emissary mission
since the deep political crisis in Armenia in 1998 which resulted in the
resigning of the first president Levon Ter-Petrossyan was due to his inclinations
to agree to the formal inclusion of MKR in Azerbaijan. On the other hand,
it follows from the materials of the local mass media that Baku seems to
have agreed to granting Karabagh a status which practically excludes any
vertical subordination of Stepanakert to its former metropolis.
It is likely that in referring
to the “peaceful revisal of the borders”, the emissaries are definitely
certain that this intention is unreal which, in turn, creates no alternatives
for bringing international forces into the zone. Therefore, their “temporary”
mission would be inevitably protracted. This is in line with the approaches
implemented by the USA in the Central Asian CIS states within the frames
of the anti-terrorist action, as well as in the context of the new arrangements
between Russia and NATO
