|
|
|
HOW TO MAINTAIN SOUTH CAUCASUS?
Time
to Finalize Relations with Allies and Partners
Vladimir
Stupishin
About
the author: Vladimir Petrovich Stupishin is the first Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ambassador of Russia
to Armenia.
"Nezavisimaya
Gazeta" (Independent Newspaper) is concerned about the further existence
of "those states in
the post-Soviet territory which have not been acknowledged yet" since they
may become the focus of NATO's
efforts" in a situation when "Russia is not able to block the way
of the West towards taking control of the
post-Soviet territories. …Russia lacks serious impetuses for counterbalancing
these emerging endencies" (cf. "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" of
March 2, 2002).
Undoubtedly, the
existence of these states, firstly, Abkhazia and Karabagh, is put at risk. Nevertheless,
Russia lacks impetuses for resisting the advancement of the USA and its allies
in the post-Soviet territories which, in turn, harms the national interests
of Russia. This is the case when even political statements may serve as impetuses.
To this point Russia has been supportive for "mini-empires" and agreed
to the groundless demonstration of their "rights" to the territories
of the neighboring nations which in fact did not belong to them not so long
ago.
Statements made
at the top official level in favor of the sovereignty of the minority nations
could put on reasonable tracks the negotiations on the new organization of the
relations between the former Soviet republics and their former autonomous units.
However, Moscow holds back from such statements although its time for Russia
to choose between those who really are its allies or simply partners and those
who have far-reaching intentions. Also, Moscow should freely assist those states
which have the same interests as Russia does.
This is critical in a situation when third parties try to create dissonance
between Russia and its strategic allies. In this aspect the pro-Azerbaijani
lobby is particularly active in attempting to thrust a wedge between Russia
and Armenia. Meanwhile, the Turkey-orientated Azerbaijan claims that it is Russia's
"bearing point in Caucasus".
On the other hand,
Azerbaijan tries to startle Russia by the NATO bases in Apsheron and a new war
against Nagorno Karabagh unless the latter does not reject its independence
in exchange of the fictitious self-governance within Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan
attempts to scare Russia and delude us, relying on our short memory. Quite unexpectedly
Moutalibov remembered about the "Khojali
Tragedy when in February, 1992 hundreds of peaceful people were killed as
the result of the joint operation of the Armenian armed forces and the 366th
Russia Infantry Regiment in the territory of Nagorno Karabagh". Did not
Moutalibov personally admit in 1992 that the "Khojali tragedy" was,
in essence, a provocation perpetrated not by the Armenians, but the people of
Elchibey against Moutalibov himself (cf.: Moutalibov's interview in "Nezavisimaya
Gazeta", April 4, 1992)?
Moutalbov referred
to the old deceptive propaganda blown up by Elchibey for inseminating discord
between Armenia and Russia. The successful development of the Armenian-Russian
relations will not be in favor of the present authorities in Baku or the opposition,
or anyone here, in Russia who are fed from the hands of the Azerbaijani lobby.
They all push Moscow towards supporting Azerbaijan in implementing its plans
on annexation of Karabagh.
For this purpose,
in addition to other means, Azerbaijan speculates with the thesis about the
so-called "pro-western" orientation of the present Armenian leaders.
Meanwhile, Yerevan merely seeks for diversifying its foreign relations which
is the only reasonable way for Armenia to survive. Moreover, what it needs is
neither pro-American nor pro-Russian, but pro-Armenian policy. And if Russia
intends to maintain its positions in Transcaucasus, it must regard the foreign
relations of its ally Armenia with understanding, particularly in such situations
when Russia itself is not able to assist Armenia. For example, the humanitarian
aid provided by the USA in the course of the last 10 years which amounts to
hundreds of million dollars. Can Russia undertake this responsibility itself?
Nevertheless, Russia
has other impetuses for strengthening its position in Transcaucasus, for example,
the cooperation in the military sphere, including air defense and borders. In
Transcaucasus such cooperation exists only with Armenia. Another impetus is
the ownership of industrial and scientific assets which is critical for holding
economic and social positions in any country. The above-mentioned issue is currently
being discussed between Russia and Armenia. The protection of Armenia involves
the defense of the borders and could more effectively contribute to the solution
of the Karabagh problem without any regard to the Turkish-Azerbaijani pressure
which is evidently in contradiction with our interests because of the far-going
Pan-Turkish intentions.
The Russian president
announced in Yerevan in September, 2001 that "Russia's policy in the region
will be targeted at ensuring Armenia's sound defense", and the resolution
of the Karabagh problem should derive from the established status-quo: "Russia
should be cautious for not destroying the balance which has been created between
Armenia and Azerbaijan". To me, this position which is in line with Russia's
interests.
In general, it is
time for Russia to stop trusting Azerbaijan in a situation when Baku swears
to Moscow about friendship forever and acts as a loyal vassal of Turkey and
a champion of Pan-Turkism. As soon as Russia goes to a compromise and gives
up Karabagh, the Turkey-orientated Azerbaijan will no longer need Russia's support.
This does not mean
termination of our relations with Azerbaijan and application of any sanctions
against it. There are around 3 million Azerbaijanis in Russia, and some of them
have received Russian citizenship. In addition, Azerbaijan is our neighbor and
Russia should treat it as a friendly neighboring state even if the latter fails
to act in the same way. We should trade and cooperate in all possible areas,
and promote cultural exchange between Russia and Azerbaijan. At the same time
Russia should not oversee the real intentions of Azerbaijan especially when
these intentions are in contradiction with the interests of Russia.
Armenia has been
our strategic partner since the very start of our relations and we need to treat
Armenia accordingly. In this aspect I mean both Armenia and Karabagh because
without Karabagh we would not have an independent and friendly Armenia. In turn,
without the latter Russia would not have any bearing points in Transcaucasus.
It follows that Russia should take Karabagh under its protection, and comprehensively
assist in strengthening its security in its historical territory the borders
of which were distorted by the Russian Bolsheviks and need to be rehabilitated.
The unity of NKR deserves to be respected just as the territorial unity of other
states.
To me, the fair
resolution of the Karabagh conflict assumes that Azerbaijan should refuse from
the authentic Armenian territories. The crucial problem of refugees can be addressed
by accommodating them in those areas where they reside now. It is senseless
to hope that the Armenians can return to Baku, Gyanja, Sumgayit, Artsvashen,
Getashen, etc. In this case why only the issue of the Azerbaijani refugees is
raised at the discussions around the Karabagh conflict?
In my opinion, the
optimal solution of the Karabagh problem is the legitimization of the status-quo
on the borders stretching along the confrontation line, as defined in the cease-fire
agreement of 1994. Today all other alternatives are simply unrealistic other
than the war on which Azerbiajan relies although it will not be of any benefit
neither for the Armenian nor the Azerbaijani peoples.
