NAGORNO KARABAGH: PROBLEM AND CONFLICT

         The purpose of this essay is to outline the methodological aspects of the settlement of the Karabagh problem and conflict. The necessity for consideration of the aforementioned issue arose because recently the negotiation process has become the subject of political speculations and the articulated views seem to be the result of the intentional or unintentional misunderstanding. Besides, very often the key issue is shadowed by the technical aspects, and the redundancy of the details makes it difficult to see the picture in its entirety. Following the logic that all that is new is the well-forgotten past, we would like to refer to the main points that were crucial at the first stage of internationalization of the Karabagh problem.

          Initially there was the clear understanding that the resolution of the problem should be found at the legal level while the settlement of the conflict should be considered at the political level. However, today the efforts are focused on the settlement of the conflict, and the resolution of the problem is regarded as something supplementary and derivative to the settlement. Moreover, as opposed to the "Karabagh problem" which formerly used to be the subject of discussion, the wording "Karabagh conflict" (or "crisis") is more commonly applied. Both logically and methodologically this is wrong and such approach has a negative impact on the ongoing processes.
         The relations between Karabagh and Azerbaijan were nearly analogous to the ones which existed between Azerbaijan and the USSR. However, in the latter case the problem did not grow into a conflict. In addition, the relative independence of the conflict and the problem assume an additional chance which can be used or neglected. In the modern political schemes it is accepted that the resolution of conflicts can be attained by freezing the conflicts themselves, i.e., a conflict can be stopped, and the political settlement of the problem can be left for the future. This was the case with Cyprus, but the exercise failed in the event of the Palestine problem.
         In the event of Nagorno Karabagh the increasingly deepening conflict-bearing components of the problem were provoked.
The problem of Karabagh itself existed long ago before 1988 when it was displayed as the problem of the will of the people of Nagorno Karabagh. Instead of resolving the problem by means of the dialogue on the basis of the applicable legal framework on the performance of the authorities of the USSR and Azerbaijan, force was exhorted and massacres were perpetrated in order to rebuff the people's will. This led to the deepening of the conflict-originating factors and, finally, to the open military confrontation.
         With respect of Karabagh, today the most acute and problematic issues are those which did not exist at the initial stage, i.e., the problem of refugees, territories, the dislocation and withdrawal of the troops, rehabilitation of the economic and social infrastructure, de-blockage of the communications, etc. None of these issues can be directly connected with the resolution of the Oblast Council of NKAO on the disunion with Azerbaijan and connection with Armenia. One can agree that today these are the more actual issues and need to be resolved as soon as possible. However, they should not prevail over the Karabagh problem which originated as the result of the spontaneous and legally inconsistent Resolution of the Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party (05.07.1921).
         The Karabagh problem is the problem of the self-determination of the people of Nagorno Karabagh, its right to choose its political, legal, economic and social status as specified in the numerous fundamental documents of the international law.
         It should be noted that the right to self-determination cannot be the subject of discussions or negotiations. How this right should be implemented is quite a different issue. As a matter of fact, in the referendum of December 10, 1991 on the status of Nagorno Karabagh the following question was posed: "Do you agree that the promulgated Republic of Nagorno Karabagh is an independent state which autonomously decides the forms of cooperation with other states and commonwealths?" Obviously, even then the form of self-determination did not exclude the establishment of federate or confederate relations with other states. Given the existing realities, a package can be proposed on the regulation of the relations of NKR with Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is out of question that the interests of Azerbaijan should be taken into account at least in light of the problem of the refugees. It is also possible to envisage and hold another referendum under the oversight of the United Nations Organization. Nevertheless, all these steps are targeted at the realization of the right to self-determination where the people of Nagorno Karabagh are the subject of self-determination and it is their prerogative to determine in what form such right could be implemented.
         Today Karabagh is ignored both in the negotiation process and international political practice, whereas Azerbaijan should be the party to be most interested in such contacts with Karabagh, because it is Azerbaijan that faces the challenge of becoming sufficiently attractive for Nagorno Karabagh to enter into certain political and legal relations assuming mutual responsibility. Such approach will definitely have a positive impact both on the settlement of the issues pertaining to the resolution of the problem itself. Today Nagorno Karabagh is not only in blockage, but also in international isolation, and its contacts with the rest of the world are realized through Armenia. This has caused the situation when the really actual problem for the population of NKR is the finalizing of its relations with Armenia rather that its relations with Azerbaijan or the international community, i.e., is NKR an independent state (the official position) or the "tenth province" of Armenia (the name of the formerly popular opposition newspaper which expressed the views of the majority of the populace).
         As to Armenia, it does not have any power to resolve the Karabagh problem itself. Its participation in the negotiation process can be justified to the extent to which it is involved in the conflict although quite often the official representatives of Armenia deny this fact (maybe because they mean the problem itself and not the conflict). At present Armenia is in blockage, and the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders are also subject to international monitoring. This mere fact implies that Armenian should participate in the regulation process. Of course, the fact that the main package of issues is beyond the competent of Armenia is quite a different issue.
         By now the methodology of the resolution process is an open question (whether the agreement should be achieved gradually or in package). Here two different aspects intertwine: the resolution itself and the process of achieving the resolution. Obviously, the final settlement can be attained only gradually, and actions should be taken on strengthening the mutual trust. A number of necessary actions have been taken already, i.e., the establishment and effective maintenance of the cease-fire regime, the exchange of war prisoners, the regular exchange of delegations of journalists, workers of science and culture, etc. In the future other possible ways of cooperation in the spheres of economy, human rights, ecology can be visualized.
         As to the finalization of the agreement (document) itself, there is only one alternative: it should be a package agreement. Firstly, due to the lack of mutual trust, the conflicting sides are concerned that the very first compromise made by any of the sides would be used by the opposite side for the purpose of strengthening its own position and would remain unanswered. For example, the withdrawal of the armed forces of NKR from the controlled areas would undermine the security of the republic, and more favorable conditions would be created for the Azeri side for embarking on the military actions again. Accordingly, at the next phase of the negotiation process Azerbaijan would be in more beneficial position and might conduct the talks from the position of force. Azerbaijan might have similar concerns, and that is why, despite the requirement on de-blockading, clearly defined in the resolutions of the UN Security Council and other international organizations, it continues blockading Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh with the reasoning that after the de-blockage Armenian might lose any interests in continuing the negotiation process. It follows that the conflicting sides would insist that all arrangements be formally documented because they do not believe in each other's verbal promises, and the guarantees provided by the emissaries are not sufficient. In such case the final version assumes a package agreement.
         If the first reason mainly pertains to the strategy of the negotiation process and, in principle, can be reconsidered, the second one is essential and can hardly be eliminated even in the future. The point is that all issues under consideration cannot be resolved beyond the context of the key issue, i.e., the issue of the status.
         The issue of borders apparently requires consideration. The concept of borders is not abstract: it is assumed that borders are indicative of the existence of any state-legal formation. Official Azerbaijan denies the existence of NKR and even NKAO (which was dissolved under the Parliament Decree of Azerbaijan as early as in the autumn of 1991, and "integrated" with the neighboring regions by the new territorial-administrative division). Therefore, in such case Nagorno Karabagh can be regarded as a rather vague geographical notion, and it is unclear which state and which borders are under question.
         On the other hand, according to the official position of Karabagh, the borders can be determined on the basis of the referendum and the elections of the Supreme Council of NKR which were held in December, 1991: these borders include also the territories which are controlled by the NKR authorities and are devoid of any Armenian population (the entire Shahumian Region and some areas of Martuni and Martakert Regions). As at this moment, the military-geographical rather than political reality is mirrored in the existing borders which can be regarded as the points of contiguity which originated spontaneously as the result of the military actions and ensured much more suitable positions for the defense for the sides and serve as security zones and therefore, as one of the key guarantees against the re-initiation of the military actions. It follows that all issues related to the borders, including the ones of political and military-technical character ( e.g. the withdrawal of the troops or determination of the zones of responsibility, etc.) can become the subject of meaningful talks only if the parties agree on what they understand under the concepts of the state-political, state-legal, administrative or any other borders and the state-political or state-legal formation concerned.
         Similarly, there is the issue of citizenship. For example, what citizenship should be the resident of Martakert receive: Armenian, Azerbaijani or that of NKR? The rights and responsibilities of the residents of Nagorno Karabagh cannot be defined, and, accordingly be protected unless this issue is resolved. The same refers to the return of the refugees, regarded by the Azeri side as a "priority". Undoubtedly, the refugees should know beforehand to what state they are supposed to return. Both the necessary level of security and the obligations on social-economic adaptation, etc. would depend on the latter.
         These and numerous other examples witness that the issue of the status should become the priority which would have a decisive role for the resolution of all other questions which would in total take the form of a package agreement. Moreover, the issue of the status itself is the condensed package resolution, because status is the entirety and derivative of the state-legal components (borders, citizenship, political institutions, forces of security, representation in international organizations, etc.).
         Today a fragile balance has been achieved which is based on various factors, such as the internal and external political situation, military, demographic factors, etc. The volatility of any of these factors may result in the collapse of the whole system. Therefore, each step should aim at keeping the balance and stability. The maintenance of stability is a priority not only for the conflicting sides, but also for the international community whereas the frequent changes without regard to the overall context may have a negative result. For example, today the official Baku can formally ignore the authorities of Stepanakert as its partner in the talks. At the same time, the absence of the legitimately elected authorities in NKR performing the full-scope functions of the state would be disastrous for Azerbaijan since such vacuum would inevitably destabilize the situation in the neighboring Azerbaijan.
         Of course, one should not feel any illusions about the rapid resolution of the problem. Nevertheless, in the near future more active and systemic and regular steps should be taken with respect of its settlement.
         Firstly, an exact distinction should be made between the conflict itself and the reasons that caused the conflict. No durable and stabile agreement can be reached unless a satisfactory interpretation to the conflict is given which means recognition of the right of the people of Nagorno Karabagh to self-determination. Secondly, considerable efforts were made with respect of the resolution of the conflict. A number of guarantees are in place which aim at the prevention of re-initiation of the military actions in light of the international monitoring and the political and military reasons. Nevertheless, these guarantees are not sufficient for the cease-fire regime to be irreversible. Therefore, along with the resolution of the problem steps should be taken on reinforcing the trust measures and security guarantees. Thirdly, one of the hindrances on the way towards a comprehensive agreement is the absence of trust among the conflicting sides which leads to the obviously unrealistic guarantees claimed by the latter. Meanwhile, as the positive experience in maintaining the cease-fire regime witnesses, trust is achieved only as the result of the cooperative actions. In this aspect it is extremely important to establish direct contacts between Baku and Stepanakert, as well as to implement at least the most moderate joint plans of mutual interests.

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